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This paper argues that variations of extant general-equilibrium monetary models 
are capable of generating real-time economic forecasts comparable in accuracy to those 
generated under the ,standard Federal Reserve Board staff methodology.  Specifically, we 
argue that over the 1984-1990 period, forecasts generated by versions of the "limited 
participation" models developed by Fuerst (1992) and Christian0 and Eichenbaum 
(1992a, 1992b) compare favorably with those contained in the Board staff's "Greenbook" 
briefing documents. We conclude that further development of these models holds 
promise for fully integrating the forecasting and policy analysis elements of the Federal 
Reserve's monetary policy advice process. 
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To a Fed economist, the "Greenbook and "Bluebook -- that is, the briefing 
materials provided by the Board of Governors' staff of economists for each meeting of 
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) -- are among the raw materials of monetary 
policy advice.  The independent research and modeling within the individual District 
banks notwithstanding, the analysis contained in each Greenbook and Bluebook 
constitutes the common focal point for FOMC-directed policy discussions throughout the 
Federal Reserve System. 
Writing in the Autumn 1980 volume of the Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series 
on Public Policy, Raymond Lombra and Michael Moran provided the first widely 
available, documented glimpse of these most basic building blocks of U.S. monetary 
policy advice.'  They explain that 
[the Greenbook] lays out the assumptions underlying the [staffs economic] forecast, 
particularly any changes in key assumptions ... ;  sums up the net implication of data 
received since the last meeting; lays out the revised forecast for GNP, inflation, 
and unemployment; and explains any significant changes in the staff's economic 
outlook.  (p. 13) 
Of the Bluebook they write: 
The Bluebook ... presents alternative short-run policy options for the FOMC's 
consideration, develops the relationship between each alternative and the 
longer-run monetary targets, and discusses the implications of each alternative 
for near-term financial developments. (p. 14) 
In describing the technical context of the long-run policy analysis provided in the briefing 
process, the authors explain that 
1  See Lombra and Moran (1  980). There were, of course, many general descriptions of the FOMC 
decisionmaking process published prior to the Lombra and Moran paper (Poole [1975], for example). 
However, theirs is the first to our knowledge that exploited declassified briefing documents. 
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projections from the staffs version of the MPS model, as well as judgmental 
projections developed with the aid of surveys, leading and lagging indicators, 
and other business cycle techniques .  .. In addition to the "no change in policy" 
forecast, there are supplemental forecasts based on alternative monetary policy 
and fiscal policy alternatives.  The FOMC debates the various alternatives and 
selects a particular longer-run money growth target.  (p. 12) 
Because access to the contents of specific Bluebooks and Greenbooks is restricted for a 
period of five years subsequent to the FOMC meetings for which they are constructed, 
Lombra and Moran base their remarks on documentation from the period between 1970 
and 1973. Thus, although these descriptions of staff briefing activities were published 15 
years ago, they actually pertain to the policy advice routine as it existed some 20 years 
ago.  Despite this fact, the Lombra and Moran portrayal of economic analysis as it 
impacts the FOMC decisionmaking process is anything but dated:  With very few (and 
very minor) changes, Lombra and Moran describe current briefing procedures as aptly as 
they do those of two decades ago. 
This inertia in the methodology of monetary policy advice stands in stark contrast 
to the enormous ferment in theoretical and empirical macroeconomics that has occurred 
over the same period.  Although advances in macroeconomics have certainly influenced 
the basic research agendas of Fed economists -- and thus have significantly colored 
perceptions of the advice that is given --  they have had remarkably little influence on the 
nuts and bolts of generating ongoing policy analysis as it is actually practiced. 
We attribute this to two widely held beliefs.  The first is the opinion that 
policymakers (and, more broadly, the general public) have been reasonably well served by 
traditional practices, not least because the cumulative wisdom of economic theory is 
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give it.  The second is the sense that state-of-the-art quantitative-theoretic models, which 
by necessity are highly stylized and abstract, are not equal to the real-time task of, in the 
words of Lombra and Moran, "developing an overall, integrated assessment of economic 
and financial developments, laying out feasible policy alternatives for consideration by 
policymakers and making specific policy recommendations." 
We have no quarrel with the tenor of this first belief:  The sincere and 
professional efforts of succeeding generations of Federal Reserve staff economists have, 
in general, contributed in substantial and positive ways to the conduct of U.S. monetary 
policy.  However, well served does not preclude better served.  In particular, analysis 
built upon a foundation of "judgmental projections developed with the aid of surveys, 
leading and lagging indicators, and other business cycle techniques" is necessarily highly 
subjective and hence limits the level of explicitness at which the policy advice process is 
conducted.  Furthermore, in practice, the staff's "current analysis" activities (the 
Greenbook exercise) are largely unrelated to explicit policy analysis activities (the 
Bluebook exercise). 
Of course, these observations lack practical content unless we can plausibly 
suggest that results from more explicit frameworks can be brought to bear on the real- 
time data analysis required of the FOMC briefing process.  A main theme of this paper is 
that it is indeed plausible that variations and extensions of extant quantitative-theoretic 
models -- which we will refer to as computable general-equilibrium (CGE) models -- are 
useful in the task of providing real-time forecasting inputs to policymakers. 
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(1993) and Leeper and Sims (1994). As in Hansen and Prescott, our quantitative 
outcomes are generated from an explicit general-equilibrium model calibrated to match 
certain key characteristics of the data, 2 la Kydland and Prescott (1994). However, 
whereas Hansen and Prescott concentrate on tracing the simulated path of real variables 
using actual realizations of shocks to factor productivity (so-called technology shocks), 
we focus on short-term conditional forecasting of output and inflation, as in the 
Greenbook.  In this regard, our experiments are closer in spirit to Leeper and Sims, who 
take up the issue of policy forecasting in the context of a theoretically restricted VAR. 
However, Leeper and Sims attempt to jointly estimate the parameters of their model's 
s,tructure and exogenous stochastic processes from time-series data, in contrast to the 
simpler calibration methodology we apply in this paper. 
The specific framework we employ is in the class of  "limited participation" 
models described by Fuerst (1992) and Christian0 (1991).  We choose this theoretical 
structure as a logical starting point because it can generate outcomes that conform with 
common beliefs about monetary policy and its effects.  For instance, the model exhibits 
neutrality of money growth in the long run (apart from inflation tax effects), short-run real 
output effects from monetary "surprises," and an inverse relationship between money 
supply surprises and nominal interest rates. In addition, our setup incorporates a central- 
bank reaction function that involves operating on a nominal interest-rate target, as in 
Carlstrom (1994) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1994).  A detailed description of our model 
is provided in section 2. 
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being called to the service of real-time forecasting. To be more specific, by the mean- 
squared-error and mean-absolute-deviation metrics, the forecast errors of  our chosen CGE 
models are comparable to those of the Greenbook projections over the 1984-1990 period 
that we study. 
We do not claim to be presenting the definitive theoretically based forecasting 
framework.  Parts of our analysis are "judgmental," in the sense that numerical outcomes 
are generated by using inputs that do not strictly arise from the theoretical structure of a 
well-defined calibration exercise.  These issues are discussed in section 3, along with the 
basic forecast results. 
Additionally, although encouraged by the forecasting potential of the CGE 
modeling approach, we also emphasize a fundamental problem with integrating policy 
analysis into the version of the model presented here.  To make this issue concrete, 
suppose that a policy regime can be cast as a simple Markov process for some policy 
variable x, given by  x,= Ax,-,  +  qt  . In our analyses, this process would describe the Fed 
reaction function, where x, is the deviation of the nominal interest rate from its mean, il 
is the autoregressive coefficient in the interest-rate law of motion, and q, is a random 
shock to policy. 
In the original sense of Lucas (1976), policy analysis corresponds to a change in 
il . However, Leeper and Sims note that most real-time policy advice -- including that 
associated with the FOMC briefing and decisionmaking process -- is better characterized 
as an examination of alternative sequences of the random variables  q,+j  ( j 2 O), holding 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9503.pdfA fixed.  Echoing a position staked out in Sims (1986), they further argue that such an 
approach is sensible, since the deviation from a strict rational-expectations construction 
implied by these experiments is unlikely to be crucial for short-run projections of 
alternative policies. 
We find that the strategy proposed by Leeper and Sims is not successful in the 
context of the modeling approach we have adopted.  Essentially, our simple treatment of 
private expectations significantly limits the range of policy experiments that can be 
sensibly conducted in our framework. As a result, fully integrating forecasting and policy 
analysis in CGE models like that presented here appears to require a sophisticated 
treatment of the nexus between private inflation expectations and regime shifts.  We 
pursue this point further in section 4. 
2. A CGE Model 
Variants of the so-called limited participation models suggested by Lucas (1990), 
Christiano (1991), and Fuerst (1992) have become increasingly popular vehicles for 
examining issues related to monetary policy.  (Recent examples include Christiano and 
Eichenbaum [  1992a, 1992bl and Coleman, Gilles, and Labadie [I9941  .)  Limited 
participation in these contexts pertains to two essential model elements.  First, monetary 
injections are asymmetric.  Second, households' ability (or, implicitly, desire) to adjust 
cash balances is limited. 
The specific variant that we adopt was developed in Carlstrom (1994) and has the 
following key features, many of which are common to other models of this sort: 
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liquid assets (base money in our formulation). 
(b)  In any given period (which we define to be one quarter), households must 
make their portfolio decision before the state of the world is revealed. 
(c)  In any given period, profit-maximizing firms purchase labor and investment 
goods.  Investment purchases become operational with a two-period lag.  Time t 
investment commitments (which are irreversible) must be financed from retained 
earnings in (unequal) increments over time t and t+l. Wage payments to labor are 
financed by one-period loans from a financial intermediary (bank). 
(d)  Money is introduced into the economy via financial intermediaries. 
(e)  Seigniorage from money creation is distributed to intermediaries in the form 
of lump-sum transfers, which are then redistributed to households (as claims on 
bank ownership). 
(f)  The monetary authority follows an interest-rate smoothing rule in determining 
the path of money growth. 
The key characteristics of the equilibrium generated by the features just described (at least 
for the parameterizations of the model we study) are 
(i)  Monetary policy surprises have non-neutral effects on output in the short run. 
Furthermore, these shocks generate apparent "liquidity effects," or a temporary 
inverse relationship between money and nominal interest rates. 
(ii) In the long run, Fisherian fundamentals determine the nominal interest rate, 
so that the steady-state nominal interest rate changes one for one with a change in 
the steady-state rate of inflation. 
In the remainder of this section, we describe these elements in more detail and explain the 
procedures used in solving the model. 
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A. The Household 
Households derive utility from consumption, Ct, and leisure, 1-Lt, to maximize 
discounted expected utility: 
Following Rogerson (1988) and Hansen (1985), we assume that labor is indivisible, so 
,  that agents either work or do not work.  In addition, we assume the existence of complete 
markets that fully insure workers against unemployment.  With separable utility, this 
implies that agents will have the same consumption whether or not they work.  In this 
case, equation (1) specializes to 
U(C,,l-L,)=ln(C,)+y(l-L,). 
Equation (1')  is maximized subject to 
p,C, 5 M, -N,  + W,L, 
and 
MI+, IR,N,+D,+F,+(M,-N,+W,L,-P,C,). 
The variables Mt, Pt, Ct, Wt,  Lt, and R, are the time t money holdings, nominal price 
level, consumption, nominal wage, hours worked, and gross nominal interest rate. 
Equation (2) is the cash-in-advance constraint, indicating that current money holdings 
finance nominal consumption expenditures.  Money holdings consist of the worker's 
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savings equal to Nt  dollars with the financial intermediary. 
Equation (3) states that the sources of cash the household uses to carry into t+l 
include interest on savings, plus dividend payments received from the intermediary (Dt) 
and the firm (Ft).  Since the household is an atomistic part of the overall economy, 
dividend payments are outside its control and are equivalent to lump-sum payments.  The 
sum in parentheses is the cash not spent after all consumption expenditures are made, 
which will be zero in equilibrium as long as the cash-in-advance constraint (equation [2]) 
is binding.  Equation (2) will in fact hold with equality as long as the gross nominal 
interest rate is greater than the time discount rate (i-e.,  R, > p). 
The model economy is subject to two fundamental sources of uncertainty: a 
monetary (or interest-rate) shock and a technology shock (described below).  Following 
Fuerst (1992), savings decisions (Nt) are made before the realization of either shock. The 
labor supply choice, however, is made after the current state of the world is revealed. 
B. The Firm 
The economy consists of one representative (competitive) firm owned by the 
representative household.  The firm produces a homogeneous good according to the, 
following Cobb-Douglas production function: 
= f(~,  ,  ePttzr  H, ) =  K,B  (e"+~l H,)'-'.  (4) 
The parameter 8 (where 0 < 8 < 1  ) is capital's share in production, and Ht is time t labor 
demand.  Labor-augmenting technical progress at time t includes a deterministic drift 
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stochastic process: 
Zt = PzZr-l 
where o < p < 1 and ~t is a serially uncorrelated i.i.d. mean-zero, normally distributed 
shock. 
At the beginning of period t, the firm must borrow from the financial intermediary 
to finance its nominal labor costs, WtHP  After production takes place, the firm pays off 
the loan and decides how much of its output it wishes to allocate toward investment, It. 
Following Kydland and Prescott (1982), we assume that it takes time to build new 
capital.  Specifically, new capital that comes on line in period t+2 is built in two phases 
over times t and t+l.  During each phase, a set fraction of the expenditure for this capital 
must be financed.  At time t, during the initial phase of construction, the first installment 
(a  ) is paid, with the remainder (1 -a)  paid at time t+l. New capital projects initiated in 
period t are defined to be  s,,  ,  where the subscript 2 indicates the time required before 
completion. Investment decisions are irreversible, so that firms must complete any 
investment projects begun in a previous period.  This assumption implies s,,  =  s,,+, ;  i.e., 
projects that are two periods away from completion today are only one period from 
completion tomorrow. 
The capital stock thus evolves according to the usual law of motion: 
= (1 -  @Kt +  s,, ,  (6) 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9503.pdfwhere 6 (0  < 6 < 1) is capital's depreciation rate.  Investment, however, is defined by 
total expenditure, rather than by physical capital accumulation as given in equation (6). 
Thus, investment expenditures are given by 
I, = aslt  + (1 -  Cx)s2,  .  (7) 
The firm uses the proceeds from selling the consumption good to retire its 
beginning-of-period labor loan, RtWtHt.  Since the firm is owned by the representative 
household, it maximizes 
subject to (4), (5),  (6), (7), and 
D,  =~[~(K,,~'U+~~H,)-I,]-R,W,H,. 
C.  The Financial Intermediary 
The representative (competitive) financial intermediary is owned by the single 
representative household.  In each period, the intermediary accepts household deposits, 
Nt, receives lump-sum transfers from the government equal to  MI+, -  M, (the seigniorage 
the government receives from money creation), and loans W,H,  dollars to the firm. 
Because it receives a lump-sum transfer from the government in each period, the 
intermediary makes a profit, which it distributes to the household as a lump-sum 
payment. 
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subject to 
F, = R,W,H, -  R,N, +  (N,  +  [M,,, -  M,] -  W,H,). 
Transfers from the government plus deposits by the household finance the firm's 
wage bill, so that the bond-market clearing condition is given by 
~t  +(~t+,  -w)=  WH,. 
Thus, in equilibrium, the parenthetical term in equation (1 1) equals zero. 
D.  The Government 
The government is the central bank, which supplies reserves to the banking sector. 
Letting it (= R, -  1) denote the net nominal interest rate, reserves are supplied such that the 
deviation of the net nominal rate from its steady-state value follows the stochastic process 
A  A 
it = pTit-l  +vt  ,  (13) 
where 0,  is an i.i.d. process with zero mean. (The overscore "hat" symbol indicates that a 
variable, the interest rate in this case, is expressed as a deviation from its steady-state 
value.)  We assume that 0 < p, < 1,  so that deviations of the interest rate from its steady- 
state value are persistent but stationary. 
The reaction function in equation (13) differs from the standard specification, 
which is typically taken to be a first-order autoregressive process for money growth (see, 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9503.pdffor example, Fuerst [I9921 and Christian0 [1991]). However, except for the brief period 
between 1979 and 1982, the operational basis for U.S. monetary policy has been an 
interest-rate target.  In the current environment especially, most FOMC decisions tend to 
be cast in terms of chosen federal funds targets.  Thus, to provide policy advice at 
"FOMC frequencies," it is useful to have a model with an explicit interest-rate target. 
Our interest-rate policy implies that money growth, which we denote by 
G, E-  M'+l ,  is endogenous.  In equilibrium, the (gross) steady-state interest rate and 
M' 
steady-state money growth rate are related by the condition 
Gss  = PRS,  -  (14) 
Equation (14) states that, in equilibrium, the growth rate of money equals the growth rate 
of nominal consumption, a condition that follows from the cash-in-advance constraint. 
By choosing an interest-rate target to represent the monetary authority's reaction 
function, we face a well-known technical problem with respect to indeterminacy of 
equilibria. We turn now to a brief discussion of this and other issues related to solving 
the model. 
E.  The Solution Approach 
Equilibrium in our model economy consists of a set of allocations such that 
households maximize utility, firms and intermediaries maximize utility-weighted profits, 
and market-clearing conditions in the loan market (equation [12]), the labor market 
L'  = H'  7  (15) 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9503.pdfand the goods market 
Ct +It  = f(K,,ept+zlHt), 
are all satisfied. 
Although the core problem is nonstationary, it is possible to obtain a stationary 
representation by normalizing relative to the aggregate money stock, Mt ,  and the 
deterministic growth trend, pt  (see Cooley and Prescott [I9941 and Cooley and Hansen 
[I9941 for details).  As in Carlstrom (1994), equilibrium in the transformed model is 
found by solving a log-linear approximation of the original problem.2 Following 
Christian0 (1991), the model's first-order conditions are linearized around its steady state, 
log-linear solutions for investment, labor, and portfolio allocations are posited, and the 
resulting decision rules are found using the method of undetermined coefficients.  This 
solution technique explicitly yields expressions for deviations of output growth and 
inflation from their steady-state values as functions of the state variables 
By choosing to model policy in terms of a nominal interest-rate target, issues 
involving the indeterminacy of equilibria must be immediately confronted.  As in the 
rational-expectations IS-LM framework examined by Sargent and Wallace (1975) and 
McCallum (198  l), one aspect of the problem arises because monetary policy is 
incompletely specified. More precisely, a full specification of the monetary reaction 
function must involve specifying not only the interest-rate target, but also the initial 
2  We do not take the logs of variables already in percentage terms, i.e., the interest and inflation rates. 
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number of money growth rules that can support an interest-rate target.  Unlike McCallum, 
however, the limited participation element of our model implies that any indeterminacy 
pertains to the solutions for real, as well as nominal, variables. 
Because we confine ourselves to analyzing deviations around the steady state, 
arbitrary choices for initial conditions are of minimal importance.  The much more 
important indeterminacy, which is independent of the initial condition problem, arises 
because there are an infinite number of stationary money growth rules that will support a 
given interest-rate target.  In essence, nonuniqueness exists in our model because a money 
growth rule that includes arbitrary "sunspot"  terms or extraneous information can support 
the chosen interest-rate target.  In our analysis, we restrict ourselves to the money growth 
rule that is both stationary and devoid of sunspot variables.  In other words, we follow 
McCallum and restrict ourselves to the money supply rule that can be supported with the 
minimal state variable set.  A complete discussion of these issues can be found in 
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1994). 
3.  Conditional Forecasting 
We turn now to the issue of conditional forecasting for output growth and 
inflation.  Specifically, in this section we compare one-quarter- and one-year-ahead 
forecasts for GNP and CPI inflation generated by our CGE model, the Greenbook, and, 
for point of reference, an unconstrained bivariate VAR (with four lags of each variable). 
Because the portfolio choice of agents in the limited participation setup is predetermined, it is more 
precisely No,  and not the initial money supply, that must be specified. 
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application of the Fisher equation. 
Before reporting the results, a few clarifying points are in order.  First, a given 
Greenbook exercise is more precisely characterized as a "projection," as opposed to a 
forecast. In other words, although Greenbook estimates are made under particular 
assumptions about policy, those assumptions do not necessarily represent the Board 
staff's forecast of what policy actions will in fact be taken.  Our model's estimates, on the 
other hand, more directly correspond to a true forecasting exercise in that we set the 
sequence of future policy actions on the basis of equation (13), which is the model's time- 
invariant representation of the Fed's reaction f~nction.~  This qualification duly noted, in 
what follows we will use the terms "forecast"  and "projection" interchangeably. 
Second, we note that the experiments, in one important regard, stack the deck 
against the Greenbook projections.  Specifically, forecasts from both our model and the 
VAR are generated using final data that were unavailable to the Board staff at the time 
their estimates were made.5 We are essentially assuming that the data inputs into the 
CGE and VAR estimates are not subject to the obviously relevant measurement error that 
arises in Greenbook projections based on preliminary data. 
Balancing this, on the other hand, is the fact that our CGE forecasts are made 
using data that would have been published only at the forecast date.  To be more precise, 
4  Although there is no technical hurdle to performing projections with our model directly, such exercises 
would be of little interest without specific knowledge of the interest-rate paths upon which each Greenbook 
projection is based. We are investigating the possibility of obtaining information about the interest-rate 
assumptions used in the Greenbook data. 
In addition, the Greenbook forecasts apply to GNP, while forecasts from the other two models apply to 
GDP. 
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recall that the model's solutions are a function of  S, = {z, ,z,-,  i  ,,  i  ,-I? k  ,,  s  It }  . Because $1, 
(the fraction of this quarter's investment expenditure that becomes operational capital in 
the subsequent quarter) is not directly observable, it is convenient to substitute from 
equation (6) (describing the evolution of the capital stock) to express the state vector as 
A  A 
S  = {z  ,  z  ,  i ,  i  ,  k ,  k  }  In constructing our forecasts, then, we simply extrapolate 
values for z, , k,,,  ,  and k,  from t-1 data and from the laws of motion in equations (5)  and 
(6). We make no effort to improve the accuracy of the CGE projections by incorporating 
available real-time data that would enhance guesses for the elements of  S, beyond these 
simple e~tra~olations.~ 
Finally, we recognize that the stochastic processes for both our theoretical model 
and the parameters of the VAR model are estimated using data for the entire sample and 
thus are based on information that was obviously unavailable at each of the forecast dates. 
Essentially, we are invoking the standard rational-expectations assumption that the model 
agents fully understand the distribution from which time series are drawn. 
Calibrating  for Forecasting 
To the extent possible, our model is calibrated following the principles laid out in 
Kydland and Prescott (1994). Most of the parameters are standard in similar calibration 
exercises (see, for instance, Christian0 [I9911 and Cooley and Prescott [1994]):  Capital's 
It is possible, for example, that better estimates of time t data on capital and the Solow residual could be 
constructed by replacing projections from the laws of motion with either monthly observations on industrial 
production and hours or updated forecasts for investment and output. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9503.pdfshare in production (8 in equation [4]) is set to 0.36.  We choose the household's 
subjective time-discount factor (p in equation [I]) to be 0.988 in order to generate a 
steady-state capital-output ratio that matches the quarterly average found in the data over 
the 1983-1994 sample period (2.3).7 In a similar vein, we set the depreciation rate (6 in 
equation [6]) to 0.02 in order to match the observed investment-output ratio (about 0.11). 
The parameter y in equation (1')  (the utility weight of leisure) is chosen so that in 
the steady state, households spend 31 percent of  their nonsleeping hours working.  The 
first-order stochastic process governing the (detrended) technology parameter z was 
estimated from data over the period 1983-1994, giving an autoregressive parameter of 
p, = 0.93. 
Our operational definitions of the interest rate and money are, respectively, the 
federal funds rate and the monetary base.  Inflation is measured by the growth rate of the 
CPI-U.  In choosing the parameters describing monetary policy, we treat the period 
beginning in 1983 as  a single monetary regime.  Despite the abandonment of reserve 
targeting in October 1982, the logistical transition to interest-rate targeting was probably 
not fully phased in until 1984 (see Federal Reserve Bank of New York [1984, 19851). 
Because of this, we estimate the autoregressive model for the federal funds rate using 
1984:IQ as the initial observation. Based on this 1984-1994 (quarterly) sample, we 
setp, = 0.98. 
The final parameter to be determined is a (the proportion of investment in time t 
that must be financed contemporaneously).  Setting a is made problematic by the lack of 
7  Our capital measure includes private fixed capital and the stock of consumer durables. 
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a as a free parameter chosen to "reasonably" match the variability of money growth 
found in the data. Furthermore, the value we choose, a = 0.75, results in procyclical 
equilibrium money growth, which is also in agreement with the data.' 
Forecast Comparisons 
We now turn to comparisons of the forecasting accuracy of our limited 
participation CGE model with those of the Greenbook and bivariate VAR models.  We 
emphasize that these comparisons should not be construed as a "horse race" between 
competing forecasting models. The entire premise of this paper is that projections 
- 
divorced from economic theory are of little value in the development of policy advice. 
Thus, our bias is to favor an explicit theoretical model over an atheoretic statistical 
model, even if the latter provides more accurate conditional forecasts. Having taken this 
position, however, we recognize that the analysis generated from highly stylized 
theoretical structures will be convincing only if connected to the data through the 
forecasting experiments inherent in the conduct of monetary policy as currently 
constructed.  The forecast comparisons we report are therefore designed to aid in 
assessing the plausibility of our CGE model in this context. 
Recall that both the inputs and solutions to the model are expressed as deviations 
from the steady state. Thus, in order to predict real-time movements in inflation and 
output growth, long-run average values for these variables must be specified. The steady- 
8  Setting a = 0 corresponds to Christiano's (1991) sluggish-capital model. 
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the actual forecasts. 
We set the steady-state fed funds rate to 7.4 percent and annual output growth to 
2.6 percent, their respective average values from 1983 to 1994. Given equation (14), the 
endogenous annual money growth rate to support this funds rate is 2.4 percent.  Because 
this rate is less than the growth rate of output chosen for calibration, the implied steady- 
state inflation rate is slightly negative (-0.2 percent annually, to be e~act).~  Strict 
consistency with the model would require that we construct inflation forecasts relative to 
the endogenously determined steady-state value.  Obviously, this value does not match 
the actual 1984-1994 sample mean of 3.7 percent.  At least part of this discrepancy stems 
from changes in the velocity trend over the sample period.  In obtaining our quantitative 
results, we simply make an ad hoc adjustment in assuming that deviations of the inflation 
rate are defined about a long-run value equal to the true sample mean.  This procedure 
amounts to assuming that the model's failure to accurately predict the steady-state level of 
the inflation rate does not contaminate its ability to capture inflation dynamics at business 
cycle frequencies.  lo 
The forecasting performance of the Greenbook, CGE, and VAR frameworks over 
the period from 1984:IQ through 1990:IVQ is reported in table 1. The terminal date of 
Defining r to be the real interest rate, the consumer's first-order condition (with log utility) is 
= P(l+  q)  . With an annual discount factor of 0.9534 and annual consumption growth of 2.6 percent, 
the implied annual real interest rate is 7.6 percent.  Since we impose a steady-state nominal rate of 7.4 
percent, it follows directly from the Fisher equation that the steady-state inflation rate must be -0.2 percent. 
This value could obviously be altered by calibrating with an  alternative discount factor or trend in output, 
but we have chosen to stick with the discipline imposed by the standard, well-defined calibration exercise. 
10 We are assuming that model agents and the forecaster know the sample means of interest rates, inflation 
rates, and growth rates during the 1983:IQ to 1994:IQ period.  In that sense, we are not being completely 
fair in comparing our forecasts to those of the Greenbook. 
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recent Greenbook information. 
The results in table 1 contain two notable features:  1) The forecast performance 
of the CGE model with respect to output growth is comparable to that of the Greenbook, 
but both do much worse than the atheoretic VARY  and 2)  The ability of the Greenbook to 
forecast inflation is comparable to that of the VAR model, but the CGE model does 
substantially worse than either. 
Because of our belief that price-level movements should be the primary concern 
of monetary policy, the relatively poor performance of the CGE model in forecasting 
inflation is the larger disappointment of these two observations.  To provide some 
additional perspective, we also generated forecasts from a naive application of the Fisher 
equation by assuming a constant real funds rate (equal to the ex post real rate over the 
1983-1994 sample) and interpreting changes in the average nominal rate as changes in 
one-quarter-ahead inflation forecasts.  These "Fisher forecasts" generated a root-mean- 
squared error of 0.205 and a mean absolute deviation of 1.88, compared to 0.189 and 1.46 
for the CGE model. 
A  "Judgmental"  Adjustment 
Although the CGE model does outperform the most naive forecasting approach, 
the advantage is hardly overwhelming.  Some insight into why the model does not 
provide more accurate inflation forecasts can be found in figure 1, which plots the one- 
year-ahead inflation forecasts from the model along with the actual realizations. 
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reveals a particularly stark failure of the model's predicted inflation outcomes. 
Recall that the period from early 1992 through the end of  1993 --- a time frame 
over which the model does very poorly indeed -- was characterized by an initial period of 
persistent declines in the federal funds rate, followed by an extended period during which 
the rate stabilized near 3 percent.  This behavior of the nominal interest rate becomes an 
input into the model through equation (13), the monetary reaction function.  Specifically, 
these funds rate realizations in the data are fed into the model as deviations from a mean 
value of about 7 percent.  The theoretical structure of the model implies that such large 
and persistent movements below the mean interest rate must be associated with a 
monetary policy that engineers an ongoing disinflation, just as figure 1 indicates. 
Although this story pertains to very recent history, it is reasonable to conjecture 
that the failure revealing itself dramatically in the early 1990s is present throughout the 
forecast period.  Two explanations immediately suggest themselves as answers to why the 
model cannot track the interest rate without these counterfactual implications for the 
inflation rate.  First, the extended sample period may be dominated by transitional 
dynamics from one steady state to another, so that the imposition of a single average 
interest rate to which the artificial economy ultimately tends creates a serious mismatch 
between the model and the data.  However, simple ad hoc adjustments for this type of 
phenomenon -- such as treating the pre- and post-1991 periods as different monetary 
regimes with distinct mean funds rates and Fed reaction functions -- do not appreciably 
improve the model's forecasting ability. 
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model's structure to capture the real interest-rate dynamics in the data.  Such a failure can 
arise from the nominal side (because the limited participation setup does not capture the 
extent of monetary non-neutralities well), from the real side (because the basic one-sector 
growth framework does not generate sufficient persistence in the expected marginal 
productivity of capital), or from the inappropriateness of the rational-expectations 
assumption." 
As an exploratory first step, we maintain the assumption that the nominal side of 
the model is correctly specified and assume that the cyclical behavior of the real interest 
rate is misspecified because of missing elements on the real side of the model.  In other 
words, we assume that 1) the model's cash-in-advancellimited participation features 
adequately capture the key characteristics of actual money demand and financial 
intermediation,  2)  the one-sector neoclassical growth features that are the foundation of 
the production side of the model cannot adequately capture the key dynamic 
characteristics of real intertemporal prices, and 3) the behavioral and technological 
additions that would help the model better match the cyclical pattern of the real interest 
rate are independent of money and financial intermediation.  l2 
Under these admittedly strong maintained assumptions, we make the following ad 
hoc adjustment to the model:  We first assume that the interest-rate process includes a 
11  Admittedly, the distinction between the real and nominal sides of our model is, in some sense, arbitrary. 
Obviously, what we have called the nominal side affects real variables via the limited participation 
assumption, and the real side -- manifested in technology shocks and the basic propagation mechanisms 
generated by the basic technologies and preferences -- affects monetary dynamics due to the interest-rate 
target. 
12  The necessity of moving beyond one-sector frameworks has already been documented in other contexts. 
See, for example, Hansen and Prescott (1993) and McGratten, Rogerson, and Wright (1994). 
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define the interest-rate shocks (i^ ) as deviations from this moving-average trend.  Given 
that the Fed reaction function depends on these deviations, equation (13) is reestimated, 
yielding p, = 0.79.  As shown by figure 2, defining policy shocks relative to the moving- 
average trend (as opposed to the sample mean) substantially alters both the magnitude 
and persistence of the interest-rate deviations. 
Figure 3 illustrates the behavior of one-year-ahead inflation forecasts when the  . 
model is adjusted in this manner.  As the picture clearly shows, the counterfactual 
prediction of a strong disinflationary trend subsequent to 1990 disappears.  Furthermore, 
as evidenced in table 2, the inflation forecasts generated by the CGE model become 
nearly identical to (and in some respects superior to) both the Greenbook and atheoretic 
VAR forecasts.  The GDP projections of the CGE model are essentially unaffected by the 
moving-average adjustment and remain in the ballpark of the Greenbook forecasts. 
The procedure just described is a judgmental adjustment to the model.  It is not an 
internally consistent element of the framework in the sense that, as we take the model to 
the data, we use a moving conditional mean of the federal funds rate that does not arise 
from the model solution. However, because the forecasting exercise has an explicitly 
theoretical basis, our ad hoc adjustment -- which might be thought of as being analogous 
to so-called add factors in traditional large-scale statistical models -- comes in the form of 
a testable hypothesis.  Specifically, the validity of our adjustment depends on the truth of 
our maintained assumption that real business cycle models can be constructed that yield 
the persistence in intertemporal prices implied by the moving-average process we have 
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further research along the lines introduced in this paper. 
4.  Policy Analysis 
The forecasting exercises just described, while of independent interest, are 
discussed here in the context of  generating policy advice.  Operationally, this means using 
the model to generate projections conditioned on a policy baseline and then considering 
alternative paths generated by different policy actions.13 
Recall our Fed policy function 
In the tradition following Lucas (1976), policy experiments are typically conceived of as 
alternative choices over the parameter p,, or more generally, over the functional form of 
the reaction function.  In other words, the idea of policy analysis conforms to the usual 
notion of a regime change.14' 
However, actual FOMC policy analysis as currently conducted is better 
characterized as involving experiments in which the form of equation (13) is maintained, 
and the policymaker "chooses"  alternative paths for the error sequence v,+~  for j 2 0. 
13  The typical Bluebook analysis does not conform neatly to this description.  In most cases, the Bluebook 
simply provides narrow operational options tied to the annual money growth targets set as part of the 
Chairman's Humphrey-Hawkins testimony. More infrequently, the Bluebook provides long-run (three- to 
five-year) projections for inflation, output, and unemployment under different monetary growth and federal 
funds choices. These long-run strategy exercises most closely represent what we mean by policy analysis. 
14  Arguments about the consistency of rational expectations and policy analysis so conceived are an 
important part of this tradition.  See, for example, Sargent (1984), Sims (1986), and Cooley, Leroy, and 
Raymon (1  984). 
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construction, because policy is being chosen in a way that violates the process upon 
which private expectations are conditioned.  However, as Leeper and Sims (1994) argue, 
this fact need not critically undermine this approach to generating policy advice.  Given 
the difficult issues of credibility that accompany fundamental changes in the process 
governing monetary policy, useful information can be gleaned from examining a polar 
case in which private expectations of the policy regime are held constant, and policy 
actions are represented as a series of nonrandom "errors." 
We view the issue as fundamentally empirical:  Does the policy exercise described 
by Leeper and Sims yield quantitatively useful information, even though it does not 
conform to the strict logical structure of our CGE model?  Unfortunately, the answer to 
this question appears to be "no,"  particularly if the relevant horizon is .a period of longer 
than four to eight quarters. 
Table 3 shows the results of an experiment in which, starting from the steady 
state, the federal funds rate path over a four-year horizon is chosen to support a 100-basis- 
point reduction in the rate of inflation, accomplished in two steps over two years.  The 
experiments abstract from shocks to total factor productivity and are based on the version 
of the model that assumes, for quantitative purposes, a constant steady-state funds rate. 
The resulting analysis looks fairly reasonable for the first few years, with "tighter" 
policy associated with rising interest rates and slightly lower output growth.  However, 
the simulation results become increasingly difficult to swallow as the policy experiment 
is extended to longer horizons:  By the end of the fourth year, our model associates a 2.7 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9503.pdfpercent inflation rate with strongly negative output growth and a 37 percent federal funds 
rate. 
The intuition for this result is fairly straightforward:  Because the interest-rate rule 
is stationary, private expectations incorporate an eventual return to the steady-state 
inflation rate.  To maintain an inflation rate below this level, the central bank must 
continually engineer positive surprises in the funds rate (surprises that private agents 
never recognize as part of deliberate policy).  These surprises are, of course, responsible 
for the rising output losses seen in table 3. 
These extreme results are driven by the failure to model explicitly what is in 
actuality a regime change.  Absent frictions in the link between expectations and private 
actions that are more extreme than those inherent in our particular limited participation 
framework, the tight theoretical structure of our CGE model appears to require a more 
sophisticated treatment of either the Fed reaction function or the expectations formation 
process if the step from forecasting to policy analysis is to be satisfactorily bridged.15 
5. Conclusions 
The theme of this paper is that quantitative-theoretic models are capable of being 
called to the service of real-time forecasting and policy advice.  We have intentionally 
chosen a relatively simple and highly abstract structure.  Furthermore, our approach to the 
l5  In his 1986 article, Sims argued that policy analysis should be thought of as choosing among alternative 
realizations of some error process that is, in estimation, i.i.d mean zero by construction.  This suggestion 
was made in the context of atheoretic VAR forecasting models. An important part of his argument was that 
the VAR structure may implicitly capture the nonlinearities associated with a nonzero probability of 
changes in the form of the Fed reaction function. Our experiments obviously do not address this claim.  It 
remains an open question as to whether the phenomenon we confront arises in the much more tightly 
constructed VAR framework proposed by Leeper and Sims (1994). 
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Despite this, when matched against the existing less structural approaches, our model 
does a remarkably good job of forecasting output and inflation. 
However, we emphasize that equaling the forecasting performance of, say, the 
Greenbook, requires ad hoc adjustments to the model that do not arise from its theoretical 
structure.  In particular, the model does not, of itself, generate empirically consistent real 
interest-rate and inflation behavior.  We argue, however, that the judgmental "tricks" 
involved in improving the model's forecasting performance do not necessarily imply that 
the monetary side of  our artificial economy is misspecified.  In fact, we contend that our 
results suggest that even those primarily interested in the effects of  monetary policy 
should take a keen interest in the further development of purely real business-cycle 
models. 
The other clear lesson is that the use of quantitative-theoretic models for policy 
analysis in no way vitiates the need to build models that seriously address the issue of 
regime shifts.  Although it is possible to examine regime shifts by assuming extreme 
credibility, such an analysis would, at least in our framework, be quite trivial:  A perfectly 
credible regime shift would be approximately neutral.  It would appear that sensible real- 
time policy advice along the lines we have suggested will ultimately require confronting 
the regime issue head on (see, for example, Cooley, Leroy, and Raymon [I9841 and 
Prescott [1993]). 
These problems are familiar ones and are equally applicable to the existing 
framework from which monetary policy advice is generated.  Our criticism of the current 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9503.pdfpolicy-advice methodology is not that it is more susceptible to the thorny issues inherent 
in bringing economic reasoning to the policymakmg table, but that it lacks the focal point 
of an explicit, widely understood theoretical structure, which compounds the difficulty of 
confronting these weaknesses.  In presenting our CGE alternative, we have in mind the 
words of Robert Lucas (1987): 
The chances that the model will survive ... criticism unscathed are negligible, but this 
seems to me exactly what explicit theory is for, that is, to lay bare the assumptions about 
behavior on which the model rests, to bring evidence to bear on these assumptions, to 
revise them when needed, and so on.  (p. 47) 
It is in "laying bare" the assumptions on which policy advice is given that, we believe, 
better monetary policy can be constructed, and it is in that spirit that our arguments are 
offered. 
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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9503.pdfTable 1: Forecasting Performance of Alternative Models 
Note: Sample period is 1984-  1990. The CGE model forecasts are calculated using an 
average fed funds rate of 7.4 percent and a reaction function given by  = 0.98;-,  +  V,  . 
Output forecasts for the Greenbook refer to real GNP.  Forecasts for the CGE and VAR 
models refer to real GDP. 
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clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9503.pdfTable 2:  Forecasting Performance of Alternative Models: 
Adjusted CGE Model 
Note: Sample period is 1984-1990. The CGE model forecasts are constructed using a 
four-quarter moving-average interest-rate trend and a reaction function given by 
A  A 
i, = 0.79i,-, +  V, . Output forecasts for the Greenbook refer to real GNP.  Forecasts for 
the CGE and VAR models refer to real GDP. 













One-  Quarter-  Ahead 
Inflation Forecasts 
One-Year-  Ahead 
Inflation Forecasts 
One-Quarter-  Ahead 
Output Growth Forecasts 
One-Year-Ahead 
Output Growth Forecasts 






Output Growth Forecasts 
One-Year-Ahead 





















clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1995/wp9503.pdfTable 3: A Policy Experiment 
Note: The experiments pertain to a policy of reducing realized rates of inflation from a 
steady-state value of 3.7 percent to 3.2 percent by the end of year one, to 2.7 percent by 
the end of year two, and to 2.7 percent thereafter.  All entries are averages over the four 
quarters in each year. 
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Deviations from  Moving-Average Mean 
-""-  Deviations from Constant Mean 
Source: Board of  Governors of  theFederal Reserve System. 
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-  - -.  Actual inflation 
One-year-ahead inflation forecast 
Note:  The CGE model is calculated using a four-quarter moving average for the interest-rate trend. 
Sources: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; and authors' calculations. 
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